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Abstract
We study behavioural responses to a widely-used tax enforcement policy that combines ele-
ments of self- and third-party reporting. Taxpayers self-report to the tax authority but must file
documentation issued by a third-party to corroborate their claims. Exploiting salary-dependent
cutoffs governing documentation requirements when claiming deductions for charitable contribu-
tions in Cyprus, we estimate that deductions increase by £0.7 when taxpayers can claim £1 more
without documentation. Second, using a reform that retroactively shifted a threshold activating
documentation requirements, we estimate that at least 64% of the response is purely a reporting
adjustment. Finally, reporting thresholds affect the responsiveness to tax subsidies.
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1 Introduction
Tax enforcement is an essential part of all tax systems, and has been the subject of an extensive
literature.1 A central aspect of the enforcement mechanism is how tax information is reported and
verified. Different methods are implemented globally, depending on the level of development and
the administrative capacity of each country. Third-party reporting is commonly viewed as the gold-
standard. In such a system, both the tax filer and a third-party provide information regarding a given
claim to the fiscal authority. At the other extreme is pure self-reporting, where the sole provider of
information is the tax filer.
In this paper, we study a widely-used but under-studied hybrid policy, which combines elements of
both self- and third-party reporting. The policy prescribes that only the filers themselves report their
information to the tax authority, but also requires that they attach documentation, issued by a third
party, to prove their claim. It therefore falls short of third-party reporting because the third party
does not itself provide any corroborating information directly to the authorities. However, at the
same time it enables the government to avoid the large investment in data infrastructure necessary
to implement direct third-party reporting, while at least partially maintaining the corroborative role
of the third party.
This hybrid policy is very common across different countries, and is for instance implemented for
many types of tax deductions. It is a particularly useful policy tool for cases where a government
wants to subsidise certain expenditures but third-party corroboration is infeasible or prohibitively
costly. In Germany, for instance, it is used in the context of various work-related expenses. One
example is a deduction for commuting costs, where tax filers can claim up to ¤4,500 without docu-
mentation, but for any amount claimed beyond this threshold, receipts issued by a third party must
be provided by the tax filer. Austria also implements this hybrid system for work-related expenses.
In France, the policy is used as a tax enforcement mechanism for charitable contributions claims,
where tax filers must attach receipts issued by the charity to their tax return. Similarly, in the US,
any non-cash charitable contribution worth more than $5,000 is only tax deductible if the tax filer
provides a form signed by the receiving charity. With charitable giving levels in the US exceeding
$400 billion in 2017 (Giving USA 2018), this tax deduction represents a significant tax expense for
the US government each year. Hence, not only is this policy used in many countries and contexts,
1For a recent review, see Slemrod (2018).
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but it is also employed in areas with a significant impact on government budgets.2
In this paper, we analyse behavioural responses to this hybrid reporting policy by exploiting the
context of charitable contributions in the Republic of Cyprus,3 where the enforcement setup is ideal
for our purposes. Charitable giving in Cyprus is subsidised through a tax deduction and this de-
duction is subject to the hybrid enforcement policy described above. Important for our empirical
methodology, the documentation requirements only activate if taxpayers report a deduction above
a pre-determined threshold. Below this threshold no documentation is required. Across the time
period we observe, this threshold varies across taxpayers and it moves at least once for all taxpayers,
offering multiple sources of quasi-experimental variation in documentation requirements.
Within this setup, we present three sets of results. First, we precisely identify the effect on claimed
deductions from this enforcement policy. Exploiting salary-dependence of the thresholds that govern
documentation requirements, we start by presenting compelling graphical evidence of discontinuities
at exactly the salary cutoffs. We then employ a regression discontinuity approach, and find that
individuals increase reporting by 0.7 pounds when 1 pound more can be claimed without providing
documentation from a third party.
Second, we use a unique reform that retroactively shifted the location of the reporting threshold to
separate real charitable giving from pure reporting responses to the change in enforcement environ-
ment. Exploiting the time-profile of responses using bunching techniques, we find that at least 64
percent of the large responses to this enforcement policy are purely changes in reporting behaviour.
This separation of reporting and real responses is crucial in a setup where we expect positive external-
ities from real behaviour, such as expenditures on charitable contributions, investments in education,
professional training, retirement savings, etc. In such cases, the goal of the fiscal authority is not
only limited to raising tax revenue, but also to encourage real responses through tax incentives.
Third, we show that the existence of such reporting thresholds can have a large impact on be-
havioural responses to changes in the level of taxes or subsidies. Using quasi-experimental variation
in tax prices generated by reforms to the income tax schedule, we illustrate this point by analysing
the elasticity of charitable contributions with respect to the price of giving. We show that this
elasticity is highly influenced by the presence of reporting thresholds because people display sticky
behaviour around these thresholds. Consequently, the way enforcement policies are designed and
2Further examples of this hybrid system include expenses on work-related tools in Germany, general work-related
expenses in Australia and Ireland, and meal expenses in Canada.
3Henceforth, we simply use the term Cyprus to refer to the Republic of Cyprus.
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implemented matters not only for the level of tax compliance, but also for peoples’ responsiveness
to other tax instruments. While we analyse this policy in the context of deductions for charitable
giving, our results are readily generalisable to all deduction types, or types of income where a third
party is involved.
This paper makes several contributions. Most importantly it adds to a growing literature evaluating
the effectiveness of tax enforcement initiatives, and in particular policies regarding information re-
porting. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to the effectiveness of third-party reporting,
much less focus has been directed at other reporting policies. This is surprising given the prevalence
of these policies across both developed and developing countries. To our knowledge, this paper is
the first to rigorously analyse a widely used hybrid enforcement policy that combines elements of
self- and third-party reporting. Further, it is one among very few papers which can directly observe
and separate a pure reporting component from the behavioural response to an enforcement reform,
and thereby set bounds on real behaviour. Evaluating the composition of the response becomes
paramount in cases like charitable giving, where we expect positive externalities from real behaviour,
and therefore want policy to induce people to change their actual giving, and not simply change
what they report.
Within this literature the paper closest to ours is Fack & Landais (2016), which analyses a reform
in France introducing a similar enforcement policy in the context of charitable contributions. While
they relate the reform to a substantial change in claimed deductions, their focus is not on identifying
the effects of the policy. Instead they use the change in reporting environment to study the effect of
enforcement strictness on the elasticity of giving with respect to price and the elasticity of taxable
income with respect to the tax rate, thereby questioning the sufficiency of the latter statistic for
optimal tax formulae.
Other papers examine different types of reporting policies. A rather large literature exists on the
impact of third-party reporting on compliance. Examples include Kleven et al. (2011), who conduct
an audit experiment in Denmark and show that the evasion rate on third-party reported income
is very low compared to self-reported income. Phillips (2014) finds a similar result analysing audit
data from the US, while Alm et al. (2009) use a lab experiment to show that compliance rates
increase with the proportion of income subject to third-party reporting. Gillitzer & Skov (2018) look
at a Danish reform which concurrently introduced automatic pre-filled tax return information and
third-party reporting on deductions for charitable contributions. Contrary to other studies (Fack &
Landais 2016, Ackerman & Auten 2011), they find little evidence of over-reporting of contributions
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before the introduction of third-party reporting. This also contradicts the findings of Kleven et al.
(2011) for other income and deduction types in Denmark.
Some papers focus on reporting policies that affect very particular types of income or deductions.
For instance, Lalumia & Sallee (2013) study the deduction for dependent children in the US. They
find that a reform introducing a requirement to report children’s full social security numbers led to a
reduction in the number of dependants claimed. Ackerman & Auten (2011) examine tax deductions
for donated vehicles. They similarly find that a reform tightening the vehicles’ valuation requirements
led to a significant drop in reported valuations, which can be credibly attributed to a reduction in
overstated claims. Tazhitdinova (2018) also uses the context of charitable contributions, but analyses
a very different enforcement policy, namely the requirement to provide fully self-reported details of
non-cash donations to charities, and finds a significant effect on claimed deductions and the level of
evasion.4
This paper further contributes to a small empirical literature on the importance of tax system design
for behavioural responses to taxes and subsidies. As already explained, this hybrid enforcement
policy is common across many countries, and is usually implemented using thresholds above which
the documentation requirements are activated. Our contribution is to consider the consequences
of embedding such reporting thresholds for the effectiveness of tax price policies. In particular, we
examine whether this policy feature affects the extent to which subsidies can induce the desired be-
havioural responses. The concept that features of the tax system matter for the size of behavioural
responses has been addressed theoretically by Slemrod & Kopczuk (2002) and Slemrod (1994), while
a few other papers provide supporting empirical evidence. Kopczuk (2005) for instance finds that the
elasticity of reported income with respect to tax rates depends on the level of deductions in the tax
system, and Fack & Landais (2016) show that both the elasticity of reported income with respect to
the tax rate and the elasticity of reported charitable contributions with respect to price are sensitive
to the level of enforcement.5 In a different context, Mishra et al. (2008) look at the effect of tariffs on
evasion of customs duties and find evidence that this elasticity is affected by characteristics correlated
4For a theoretical contribution deriving the allocation of resources between audits and information reporting in an
optimal tax enforcement policy setting see Kuchumova (2017). For literature focusing instead on firms’ responses to
information reporting and other enforcement policies, see for instance Almunia & Lopez-Rodriguez (2018), Naritomi
(2018), Carrillo et al. (2017), Slemrod et al. (2017), Agostini & Martinez A. (2014), etc. The context of firms is
however significantly different from the one examined in our paper.
5A related paper in this context is Doerrenberg et al. (2017), which documents responsiveness of total deductions
to tax changes in Germany, as well as a significant difference between the elasticity of gross and taxable income.
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with enforcement possibilities. We add to these findings by showing that reporting thresholds lead to
very sticky behaviour and hence reduce the responsiveness to subsidies such as those for charitable
giving provided by many countries around the world.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional environment and
the data we use in the empirical analysis. Section 3 goes through our results from the regression
discontinuity analysis investigating behavioural responses to the reporting policy. In section 4 we
use bunching techniques to separate real and reporting responses. Section 5 presents our results on
the importance of reporting thresholds for the tax price elasticity of charitable contributions, and
section 6 concludes.
2 Institutional context and data
In this section, we describe the institutional context of charitable giving in Cyprus, the associated
reforms we exploit, and the administrative dataset we use to analyse this enforcement policy.
2.1 Institutional details
As in most countries, charitable giving in Cyprus is subsidised through tax incentives. Specifically,
the amount donated is deducted from taxable income, reducing the effective price of giving to (1−τ),
where τ is the marginal tax rate. Due to administrative constraints, there is no automatic third-
party reporting by charities to the tax authority. Instead, tax filers are required to provide receipts of
donations. To reduce both hassle and administrative costs, a threshold has been set, up to which no
receipts are necessary. For any amounts claimed beyond this threshold, receipts must be provided.
We exploit several sources of exogenous variation in these reporting thresholds and in marginal in-
come tax rates, which allow us to examine how contributions respond to the filing environment. We
first explain the reforms associated with the filing environment. The reporting threshold schedule,
determining at which donation level receipts are necessary, features several discontinuities and re-
forms between 1999-2010. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Prior to 2003 the maximum amount one
could declare without providing receipts was a function of salary income. For salary earnings above
CYP 10,000, this threshold was CYP 150, for earnings between CYP 7,500-10,000 it was CYP 100,
etc. These salary-dependent cutoffs, introduced in 1989, were abolished by the Regulatory Admin-
istrative Act No. 823 of 2003. No new law or regulatory act set any new thresholds; rather, the tax
authority created a de-facto threshold at CYP 150 for everyone by clearly stating the following on
the 2003 tax form: “For donations above £150 please attach receipts” (shown in Appendix Figure
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Figure 1:
Reporting thresholds over the sample period
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Notes: The figure illustrates the thresholds up to which people could claim deductions for charitable contributions without
providing receipts. In the years 1999-2002 this threshold was dependent on salary income with 5 different notches in the
schedule. From 2003 the threshold became independent of income and was set at CYP 150. In 2008 this threshold was changed
again to CYP 175.
6b). This is the first tax form that denotes a specific threshold; up to 2002 the tax form simply
stated: "attach relevant receipts" (Appendix Figure 6a). The 2003 wording was kept the same up to
2007.
This threshold was changed again when Cyprus switched currency and adopted the Euro. The Euro
was phased in during 2008, and the tax return for the 2008 fiscal year (which coincides with the cal-
endar year) had to be filed in Euros. The tax return now stated “attach receipts only for donations
above ¤300” (Appendix Figure 6c). Given the locked exchange rate6 of CYP0.585274 = ¤1, this
was equivalent to CYP 175. Tax returns are published after the end of the fiscal year and need to
be submitted by the end of April. Therefore, this new threshold was published after the end of the
6This became legally binding by the Regulatory Administrative Act No. 311/2007.
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2008 fiscal year, precluding any real responses in contributions during 2008.
Besides salary specific discontinuities and reforms, we are also able to exploit exogenous variation in
the tax price of giving generated by marginal tax rate reforms. The Appendix Figure 7 shows the
income tax schedule in Cyprus between 1999-2010, where marginal tax rates were changed six times
in total, affecting all parts of the income distribution.
Our empirical strategy draws on three sources of variation generated by the institutional setting. We
start by focusing on the pre-2003 salary-based discontinuities in the filing threshold to establish that
donations respond strongly to this reporting policy . We then exploit the unique timing of the 2008
reform of the reporting threshold to set bounds on the real and pure reporting components of the
response. Lastly we draw on the variation in marginal tax rates to estimate the tax price elasticity
of donations and examine whether this is sensitive to the design of the filing environment i.e. the
presence of reporting thresholds.
2.2 Data
The data come from first-time access to the administrative records of the Tax Department of the
Republic of Cyprus. It covers the universe of tax filers between 1999-2010, and includes information
from the main fields of the I.R. 1A tax return, as well as basic demographic and firm-related char-
acteristics. All employees are required to file taxes, unless they earn a gross amount below some tax
free level. The self-employed are required to file regardless of the amount earned. Besides individuals
with earnings from labour, the dataset also includes pensioners and individuals out of the labour
force who may be filing because it is a requirement for accessing government welfare programmes.
To create our working dataset, we impose the following restrictions. First, we consider only individ-
uals with a single employer, who report at least some positive salary income and are aged between
25-54.7 Second, we drop individuals in the top 0.1% of donations. Our working dataset contains
about 1.5 million observations and 225,000 unique individuals. Table 4 shows summary statistics for
our sample.
It is important to note that due to the way the tax administration provides the tax data, our variable
measuring donations also includes trade union subscription fees, which is another tax deduction that
appears on the same section of the tax return. Prior to 2003, it also includes a so-called “profes-
sional” tax. This is a lump-sum tax that was a step-function of earnings (Figure 8 in the Appendix
7As is explained below, we need to know workers’ sector and salary to determine their potential union membership
fees. In our data, we can observe individual salaries, but not salaries per employer. We therefore drop the 3% of our
sample having more than one job, to ensure we can do this accurately.
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shows the exact schedule). We deal with the professional tax by simply removing the amount from
our variable, as we know the exact amount individuals had to pay based on their salaries.
The only remaining issue is that of trade union membership fees. This does not affect our first two
empirical strategies, because we use variation where adding noise to the measure should not affect
any results. For instance, in the case of the regression discontinuity design this should only shift
the level on both sides of the cut-off, but not affect the size of the discontinuity.8 Similarly, for our
bunching estimates fees should affect both the level of bunching and the counterfactual similarly
leaving the bunching estimate unchanged. Further, we are not interested in the level of bunching
per se, but in the changes in bunching across years. However, for the last part of the analysis, where
we consider elasticities, these union fees play a role and we need to correct for them. Since we don’t
directly observe trade union membership in our data, we tackle this issue by using detailed sectoral
information available in our dataset, which we combine with information on union fee rates we have
collected directly from trade unions and from the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance. Union
fees are a fixed proportion of salaries, deducted every month from employers through the PAYE
system. We use the information on union rates, salaries and sectors to residualise our donation
measure from union fees in highly (or fully) unionised sectors where we can be sure we are correctly
accounting for them.
To our advantage, union membership in Cyprus, which has about 50% coverage in our study pe-
riod (Ioannou and Sonan 2014) is highly concentrated in just a few sectors: commercial banking, the
public sector, hotel services and construction. Due to industry-wide agreements and automatic enrol-
ment upon employment, both the public sector and commercial banking have nearly 100% coverage
(Ioannou and Sonan 2014). They are also relatively large sectors, and together make up about 43%
of our estimation sample (7% banks, 36% public sector). In comparison, hotel and construction have
unionisation rates of about 75%, and make up 3% and 7% of our sample respectively. Besides these,
union membership is very low for the remaining sectors. Our raw donation measure will therefore
only be significantly affected for workers in the highly unionised sectors, for which we can accurately
correct.9 For each of our empirical strategies, we run a battery of robustness checks to show that
our results are not affected by the way we deal with union fees.
8Importantly, union fee rates are fixed across all salary ranges and did not change following any tax or threshold
reforms.
9In the few cases where we cannot, we simply drop them from our analysis. For instance, we exclude the public sector
whenever we run specifications using our adjusted measure because our data does not distinguish between different
types of workers in the public sector which are subject to different union fee rates within the sector.
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3 Behavioural responses to a hybrid reporting policy
We begin our empirical analysis by presenting motivating evidence showing that reported contribu-
tions seem to respond strongly to changes in the reporting environment. As explained above, our
period of analysis includes two reforms, implemented in 2003 and 2008, both of which increased the
levels of the reporting threshold. In Figure 2, we check whether they relate to reported donations
by plotting the average donations over time, and marking the years before the reforms with vertical
dashed lines. Apart from an increasing time trend, the raw timeseries clearly reveals two sharp jumps
exactly in the two reform years. This initial time-profile of donations suggests that these reforms,
which uniformly relaxed the enforcement environment, caused a substantial increase in reported do-
nations in Cyprus.
Given this evidence, the following section aims to identify the causal effect of this hybrid enforce-
Figure 2:
Yearly average donations among donors
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Notes: The figure shows the yearly average of donations using only observations where donations are positive. We remove the
top 0.01% of donations within each year. The sample includes all tax filers in the age range 25-54, with some positive salary
income and only one job within a given year.
ment policy on reported donations. We do this by exploiting our first source of quasi-experimental
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variation: the salary-based discontinuities in the amount of donations tax filers can report without
receipts before 2003.
3.1 Regression discontinuity estimates
As shown in Figure 1, the reporting threshold was a function of gross salaries before 2003. This setup
lends itself to a regression discontinuity design. For our main RD estimates, we use years 1999-2001
and restrict our sample to those with only salary income. We exclude 2002 because a reform in
that year shifted the first income tax threshold to CYP 9,000, meaning that individuals with salaries
below this level cease to be a reliable sample as they had no obligation to file a tax return and no
tax incentive to claim deductions. We also exclude individuals with non-salary income because the
threshold we want to exploit is a function of salary income, and we want to preserve the income
trend in donations.10 We focus on two discontinuities: the jump from CYP 100 to CYP 150 at the
CYP 10,000 salary cutoff, and the jump from CYP 60 to CYP 100 at the CYP 7,500 salary cutoff.
We do not consider lower cutoffs because they are located at income levels where individuals have
no tax filing obligation.
Figure 3 plots the average donation by salary bins of width 50 between 1999-2001. As is clearly
seen, donations jump at exactly the salary cutoffs associated with different reporting thresholds,
but otherwise evolve smoothly. Note that our measure here also includes professional taxes and
union fees. We do not remove these, since neither involve any discontinuities at our salary cutoffs
of interest. This can be seen in Appendix Figure 8, which shows that the professional tax indeed
evolves smoothly across these cutoffs. Likewise, union fees are always set at a fixed percentage of
salary, and hence do not jump at different income levels.
Our aim is to estimate the jumps in reported donations using an RDD, treating individual salaries
si as our assignment variable. Before doing so, we check that our identification strategy is valid.
The identifying assumption is that there is no precise manipulation of the assignment variable, i.e.
workers cannot precisely choose their salaries in order to manipulate the different thresholds. For
instance, if workers just to the right of a threshold strategically placed themselves there in order
to be able to report more, then workers with salaries just below the threshold would not provide
a valid counterfactual. The possibility that workers specifically search for wage-hours packages in
order to respond to the thresholds associated with charitable giving is however very unlikely. More
importantly, even if this scenario were true, it is highly unlikely that they would be successful in
10For robustness, we also run our main specification including 2002, and including individuals with non-salary income,
and find very similar results.
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Figure 3:
Average donations by income 1999-2001
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Notes: The figure shows average donations by income pooled in the years 1999-2001. We use income bins of 50 including the
left-hand value. We include people with only salary income and only one job within a single year and remove people with an
income at an exact round number (multiples of 500).
doing so precisely. There are significant labour market frictions associated with searching for wage-
hours packages. Indeed, a public finance literature on taxable income bunching (Chetty et al. 2011;
Kleven and Waseem 2013; Gelber et al. 2017) and work hours constraints (Dickens and Lundberg
1993; Blundell et al. 2008) shows that there are significant frictions associated with precisely choosing
earnings.
We check for evidence of manipulation by examining the density of salaries, as shown in the Appendix
Figure 9. A sign of manipulation would be significant amounts of bunching or sorting around the
donation-related salary cutoffs, but not elsewhere. In particular, we would expect individuals to
sort just to the right of these cutoffs, in order to take advantage of the higher reporting thresholds.
As we see, this is not the case. Figure 9a in the Appendix shows some bunching at our cutoffs,
but there is also (much larger) bunching at many other levels. Specifically, this comes from round-
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number bunching at all multiples of CYP 500, which is characteristic of the fact that salaries have
a high propensity to be set at round numbers. This is also confirmed by Figure 9b, which shows
the density of salaries when we drop individuals with a salary that is an exact multiple of CYP 500,
i.e. si mod 500 = 0. In this case, the bunching at our cutoffs disappears, as it does at all other
round numbers. We also use a McCrary test to formally test for the existence of any significant
discontinuities in the density around each cutoff, the results of which are also reported in the figure.
In line with visual evidence, the null of no discontinuity cannot be rejected, supporting our identifying
assumption of no precise manipulation of si.
We proceed by dropping the rounders from our estimation sample, but show as a robustness check
that their inclusion does not change our results. To estimate the size of the discontinuities, we treat
individual salary si as our assignment variable, and run regressions of the form:
Yi = α0 + α1Treatedi + f(si, β) + Treatedi × f(si, γ) +X ′iδ + i (1)
where we define, for each threshold T ∈ {7500, 10000} separately, Treatedi = 1{si ≥ T}. Here
f(si, ; ) is a polynomial function with parameter vector β that controls for the salary trend and γ
that controls for the interaction between the salary trend and treatment status. The parameter
α1 measures the jump in average donations due to the change in the reporting threshold. Some
specifications also include a vector of controls X (sex, year and sector fixed effects). Lastly, we only
consider bandwidths of up to 2000 to ensure that no estimation sample includes more than one cutoff.
Table 1 shows our results split into two panels: A for the CYP 10,000 cutoff and B for the CYP 7,500
cutoff. To check robustness of our estimates, we present results from eight different specifications
of equation (1): with a first and second order polynomial of the assignment variable,11 with and
without controls, and with different bandwidths. Each panel reports two estimates: (a) the size of
the discontinuity, and (b) the implied takeup, which scales our estimate by the size of the notch in
the donation schedule.
Starting with the 10,000 cutoff, column (1) of Panel A shows that the effect of increasing the
threshold from CYP 100 to CYP 150 is a CYP 36.64 increase in donations, with this effect estimated
with very high precision. This estimate implies a takeup of 73%, i.e. that workers increase their
donations by 0.73 for every unit increase in the amount of donations that can be reported without
11As is clear from Figure 3, a linear specification allowing for different slopes on each side of each threshold should
suffice. For robustness we nevertheless also report results using second-order polynomials. We have also estimated
specifications with higher order polynomials, and found that this does not change any results.
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Table 1:
Regression discontinuity estimates at notches in donation schedule
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 36.64
(0.95)
∗∗∗ 33.80
(1.41)
∗∗∗ 34.40
(0.97)
∗∗∗ 32.51
(1.45)
∗∗∗ 35.08
(1.33)
∗∗∗ 35.12
(2.04)
∗∗∗ 33.79
(1.38)
∗∗∗ 34.15
(2.12)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.73 0.68 0.69 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69
Observations 84 255 84 255 68 697 68 697 43 095 43 095 35 404 35 404
R2 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.20
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 29.64
(0.74)
∗∗∗ 31.77
(1.08)
∗∗∗ 30.48
(0.79)
∗∗∗ 30.91
(1.14)
∗∗∗ 30.78
(1.01)
∗∗∗ 26.50
(1.51)
∗∗∗ 30.21
(1.06)
∗∗∗ 26.30
(1.58)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.74 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.66 0.76 0.66
Observations 92 433 92 433 71 095 71 095 51 850 51 850 40 123 40 123
R2 0.29 0.29 0.37 0.37 0.17 0.18 0.27 0.27
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating specification (1) on our main sample pooled over 1999-2001. The Implied
takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter
estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of
order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
providing receipts. These results are highly robust to the choice of polynomial order, inclusion of
controls, and bandwidth. As columns (2) - (8) show, the estimated effect is on average CYP 34.5 and
the implied takeup is hence about 70%. Very similar results are found when we consider the second
cutoff at CYP 7,500 (panel B). The increase in donations is estimated close to CYP 30 across all
specifications. This is lower than the effect estimated at the higher cutoff, which is expected given
that the discontinuity in the reporting threshold is also smaller in magnitude. When we scale the
effect by the size of the notch, we find a very similar implied takeup, estimated at 74%, which sug-
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gests that the behavioural responses are highly comparable across the two cutoffs. Again, estimates
are extremely robust to the alternative specifications across (1)-(8).
We next present robustness tests of our estimation sample. First, we include individuals with round-
number salaries. Second, we include the year 2002. Third, we include individuals who also have
non-salary income (conditional on having some salary income). Fourth, we use our variable cleaned
from professional taxes and union fees.12 Lastly, we run separate regressions for individuals working
in highly and not highly unionised sectors. The results are shown in Appendix Tables 5-11. Our
estimates are extremely robust to every variation we consider.
As a last robustness test we also check for any discontinuities in covariates around our cutoffs.
Non-smoothness in covariates could suggest non-smoothness in the distribution of unobserved het-
erogeneity, thereby casting doubt on the validity of our method. We consider four covariates: age,
the probability of being female, the probability of working in a highly unionised sector, and the level
of other deductions. We also check the first and last price of giving, where these are defined as the
prices before and after donations respectively.13 Figure 10 in the Appendix shows plots of each of
these cases as a function of our assignment variable. All plots confirm smoothness around our two
cutoffs.
Finally we investigate heterogeneity in these responses by sex and age. Appendix Table 12 shows
results for males, and Table 13 for females. We do not find any notable heterogeneity around the
10,000 cutoff, but do find a somewhat larger response around the 7,500 cutoff among females. The
implied takeup for females is around 0.82, compared to 0.66 among males.14 Appendix Table 14
shows results for taxpayers aged 25-39 and Table 15 those aged 40-54. Younger taxpayers seem to
respond slightly more to the lower cutoff, but slightly less to the higher cutoff, compared to older
taxpayers. The implied takeup rate among the younger group is about 0.62 at 10,000 and 0.77 at
the 7,500 cutoff. Among the older group, it is 0.75 and 0.68 respectively. Overall, these results do
not reveal substantial heterogeneity, and importantly all groups seem to exhibit large responses in-
dependent of specification or cutoff choice. Even the lowest takeups are quite substantial, confirming
the large impact this reporting policy has on taxpayer behaviour.
12In this case, we drop the public sector from Table 8 because we cannot correct the trade union payments with high
precision.
13These definitions are explained in detail in Section 5.
14These are the averages of the implied takeups across specifications.
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4 Separating real and reporting responses
Having established that reported donations respond strongly to this enforcement policy, we now
focus on characterising the composition of this response by exploiting the timing of the 2008 reform.
As explained, the threshold up to which no receipts are necessary was moved from CYP 150 to CYP
175 (300 Euros) in 2008, but this change was only announced after the end of the 2008 fiscal year.
Hence, at the time of the announcement it was no longer possible to adjust real giving behaviour
and therefore any response to the new threshold in 2008 can only be a pure reporting adjustment.
To exploit this unique characteristic of the reform we examine bunching patterns around the report-
ing thresholds and how these patterns change in the year of the reform. To do this, we implement
standard bunching techniques (Saez 2010; Chetty et al. 2011; Kleven 2016) and estimate the excess
mass of individuals located at each threshold between 2003-2010. Our bunching results then allow
us to estimate what proportion of observed responses are pure reporting effects by comparing the
bunching (excess mass) in 2008 at the CYP 175 new threshold, which can only be driven by a pure
reporting response, to the bunching in 2007 at the CYP 150 threshold:
LR =
B
2008
175
B2007150
(2)
In words, LR reports the fraction of the excess mass at the previous threshold that moves to the
new threshold before real responses are feasible. LR provides a lower bound on the pure reporting
response, since responses in subsequent years can include both a real and a reporting dimension.
4.1 Bunching responses to reporting thresholds
We start by showing the dynamic bunching patterns in the data using our main sample, defined in
the same way as in the RD section. We do not remove union fees because we want to preserve the
raw patterns in the data. This of course means that we are identifying our effects from the non-
unionised sample. We show in the next section that our results are highly robust to accounting for
union fees. We group donations in bins of width 5 and fit an 11th order polynomial to estimate the
counterfactual mass of filers in the absence of these thresholds. The difference between the actual and
counterfactual count is therefore the excess mass ascribed to the discontinuous change in reporting
requirements at the threshold. In our estimation, we also control for round number bunching in
multiples of 50 and 100 (thereby flexibly allowing for different levels of roundedness for each).15
15For years 2008-2010, we have converted the currency from Euros to CYP using the official exchange rate. In this
case, we control for round numbers by using the CYP converted amounts of the round numbers in Euros, since that
was the actual currency used to file the tax return.
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Figure 4:
Bunching around reporting thresholds
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of donations among salary earners between 2003-2010, by plotting the yearly
empirical distributions in bins of width CYP 5. Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess bunching mass b around the CYP
150 and CYP 175 thresholds, with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Vertical solid lines mark the relevant threshold
that is in place in a given year (CYP 150 during 2003-2007 and CYP 175 during 2008-2010), while dashed lines mark the other
threshold that has either been eliminated, or has not been yet introduced.
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Figure 4 shows the empirical density of reported donations between 2003-2010 for our main
sample, in bins of CYP 5. To get a sense of the magnitude of the bunching in each year, each sub-
figure reports the normalised excess mass at each threshold, b150 and b175, with bootsrapped standard
errors shown in parentheses.16 To highlight how the bunching moves across the two thresholds, each
sub-figure also demarcates the threshold in place in a given year by a solid vertical line, and the
other threshold by a dashed vertical line. We do not include the estimated counterfactuals here to
avoid cluttering, but show these separately for each threshold in Appendix Figures 11 and 12.
We find that bunching at the CYP 150 threshold is very large in magnitude and sharp (i.e. there is
no diffuse bunching around the threshold). The normalised excess mass steadily increases between
2003 and 2007, starting from a level of 9.3 and peaking at 27.2 in the last year this threshold is
effective. By 2007 therefore, there are 27 times as many individuals at CYP 150 compared to what
there would be absent the filing discontinuity. At the same time, there is no excess bunching at CYP
175 throughout this period (marked with a dashed vertical line). These patterns are followed by
a dramatic change in 2008. The bunching at CYP 150 stops growing and instead exhibits a large
drop to 7.5, and continues decreasing thereafter. Bunching at CYP 175 now appears, producing a
normalised excess mass of 9.9 in 2008. In a symmetrically opposite way to the bunching at CYP
150, bunching at the new threshold exhibits further growth in years 2009-2010. What is striking is
that while there is no bunching in any year before 2007 at CYP 175, a very large spike appears in
2008, even though there was no knowledge of this new threshold, and hence no real response possible
during the 2008 fiscal year. The bunching dynamics also suggests learning, as it seems to take time
for individuals to understand the incentives created by the thresholds and respond to them over the
years.
4.2 Estimating a lower bound for pure reporting responses
We next turn to our estimate of LR. To obtain this, we restrict our sample to a balanced panel of
tax-filers present in our data in all years between 2003-2010.17 This is important when we directly
compare patterns across time as we may otherwise bias our estimates due to entry and exit from
the sample. To generate our estimate of LR we use the non-normalised excess mass such that if the
entire excess mass from the CYP 150 threshold moves to the new threshold in 2008 we get LR = 1.
To visualise the dynamics, Figure 5 plots the non-normalised bunching estimates at each threshold
across time, with the shaded areas demarcating our 95% confidence intervals. The patterns show
16We estimate the normalised excess mass b by scaling the excess mass by the height of the counterfactual.
17The bunching patterns presented in the previous section remain identical when we impose this sample restriction.
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how tax-filers in our panel shift around the two thresholds across time, and elucidate how striking
the reversal in the bunching mass between the two thresholds is around the time of the reform.
Using our estimates of B2007150 and B
2008
175 we get LR = 0.64. This implies that at least 64% of the
Figure 5:
Bunching (excess mass) estimates over time
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Notes: This figure shows for the balanced panel of our main sample of salary earners, the estimates of the excess mass around
both the CYP 150 and 175 thresholds, between 2003-2010. The shaded areas demarcate 95% confidence intervals.
response to an increase in the reporting threshold is due to pure changes in reporting, rather than
real changes in contributions.18 In relation to our results from the previous section, this means that
taxpayers increase reported donations by £0.7 when they can claim £1 more without documentation,
and at least £0.45 of this increase is a pure reporting adjustment unrelated to real giving. To the
extent that individuals take time to learn about, and understand, the changes in the reporting
environment, the responses in 2009 and 2010 may also capture reporting responses and hence LR is
a lower bound on the pure reporting component.
Next, we further exploit the panel dimension of our data to check whether the patterns we observe
18If we impose a less strict sample restriction of requiring tax-filers only to be present in 2007 and 2008, this estimate
increases to 67%.
18
are indeed driven by individuals moving from the old threshold to the new one. In Appendix Figure
13, we plot the empirical density of reported donations between 2003-2010, for the sample bunching
at CYP 150 in 2007. We find that the overwhelming majority of the 2007 bunchers are "repeat"
bunchers, locating at CYP150 for up to 4 years earlier. They also overwhelmingly shift to the new
threshold in 2008, while some take a further one or two years to complete the shift. Appendix Figure
14 repeats the analysis for those bunching at the new threshold in 2008. Again, we find the same
patterns; these are individuals who were previously bunching at the old threshold for up to 5 years
before, with the shift being nearly complete by 2010.
Figure 16 in the Appendix plots the fraction of individuals with reported donations at (1) the 150
threshold, (2) the 175 threshold, (3) above 150 and (4) above 175 throughout the entire sample period.
The trends in the fraction of individuals filing 150 and 175 is in line with our previous results. The
fraction of individuals at 150 is increasing from 2003 and peaks at 2007, before dropping sharply
in 2008. Conversely, there are very few at 175 until 2008, when it increases sharply. What is more
interesting is the trend in the proportion of people filing more than 150 and more than 175. While
they exhibit parallel trends up to 2008, there is a sharp increase in the fraction of individuals filing
above 150, but no change in the fraction of those filing above 175. This confirms that the movement
is purely between these two thresholds, and emphasises how important the reporting environment is
for taxpayer behaviour.
4.3 Robustness analysis
We next discuss the robustness of these results and conduct a battery of checks on our main results.
First, it is very important for the validity of the lower bound that the 2008 threshold change was
not anticipated or somehow made public before the end of the fiscal year. Before the introduction
of the Euro there was a large government campaign informing citizens that during the transition
they should simply use the official locked exchange rate to convert prices, salaries etc. Following
this, filers should have expected the threshold to remain unchanged at a converted value of ¤250,
not ¤300. Further, tax returns are not published before the end of the fiscal year. Even if it was
published early through unofficial channels, it is highly unlikely that filers would be so keen to obtain
their tax return before the end of the fiscal year that they would search for it. The fiscal year ends
four months in advance of the tax return submission deadline and looking at the data on tax return
submission dates we see that the vast majority of tax filers procrastinate, and submit their return
just before the deadline of April 30th of the following year (see Figure 15 in the Appendix). Most
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file in the last week of the deadline. This behaviour is clearly at odds with active tax return search
and filing behaviour.
Second, we consider whether our bunching patterns could be affected by the existence of union fees.
This would be implied by two, extremely unlikely, scenarios. The first is that we are picking up
bunching at thresholds that is driven purely by fees which coincidentally place individuals at the
thresholds. The second is that we are picking up the sum of union fees and donations, which again
happen to consistently sum to these thresholds. Both are implausible. The first case would require
that the salaries of such bunchers were at a level prior to 2008 that, when the fixed % of salary paid
as union fees was applied, would place them at the filing threshold. At the same time, their salary
in 2008 would also have to grow by a rate exactly large enough to move them to the new threshold
(a 16.67% increase). Thereafter, they would again have to revert back to a zero growth rate in order
to stay at the new threshold. We can in fact check this. Figure 17 plots the salary growth rate of
the 2007 bunchers and shows that this is not the case;19 salary growth rates are far from what this
extreme scenario would imply. The second case would require a very high level of sophistication and
meticulous tax planning. Specifically, individuals would have to predict their exact yearly salary and
union fees, and dynamically adjust their donations to crowd-out union fees one-for-one, so that these
would always sum to the exact threshold by the end of each fiscal year. Not only is this implausible,
but importantly taxpayers have no financial incentive to engage in this form of planning in the first
place.
Nevertheless, we conduct robustness checks where we repeat our previous analysis, but restrict the
sample to only workers not in highly unionised sectors. In this case, the contribution of any union
fees will be minimal because the proportion of unionised members in this sample will also be limited.
Our full set of results is presented in Appendix Figures 18 - 21. The bunching patterns in the yearly
densities are nearly identical to our main findings, and we get the exact same lower bound estimate
for the reporting response (of 64%). Our main results are therefore highly robust to the presence of
union fees. This of course means that we are identifying the effect of the 2008 reform from non-union
members, since union members would be scattered around these thresholds with their donations, and
as the previous analysis revealed, their union fees would place them to the right of them. This does
not affect our analysis, since systematic union fees would only potentially affect the level of bunching.
We are not however interested in this level per se, but rather in the ratio of bunching, between 2008
and 2007. While this is identified from the non-unionised, our result is fully generalisable as long as
19There is a large drop from 2008, driven by the financial crisis.
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we believe that union members are not fundamentally different from non-members. We check this
by next repeating our analysis after removing union fees among the highly unionised sectors.20 The
results are shown in Appendix Figures 22 - 25. We find the exact same patterns, with our lower
bound estimate of the reporting response being again very similar to our previous estimates (60%).
As a final robustness test, we check whether our main results are sensitive to our choice of the poly-
nomial order used to estimate the counterfactual density. This affects our estimate of the bunching
mass and can thereby influence our estimate of the reporting response, LR. Figure 26 plots esti-
mates of LR for every polynomial order in unit intervals from 3 to 12, and shows that our results are
extremely stable around the estimated value of 64%.21
5 The elasticity of giving and reporting thresholds
The tax authority incentivises charitable giving by offering a tax deduction on reported contribu-
tions, and relies on the described hybrid enforcement policy for compliance. This hybrid policy
is implemented using reporting thresholds determining the contribution level where documentation
requirements activate. As our analysis has established, taxpayers’ reported contributions respond
strongly to changes in these reporting thresholds, and moreover, a large fraction of these responses
are simply changes in reporting, rather than changes in real giving. Furthermore, this setup leads to
very sharp bunching behaviour because taxpayers actively target these threshold values. This then
begs the question of whether the existence of such thresholds affects taxpayers’ responses to the size
of the tax deduction, especially if such bunching behaviour is sticky. To test this, we exploit a further
source of quasi-experimental variation - changes in the price of giving generated by tax rate reforms
- to estimate the elasticity of reported donations with respect to price. The tax rate reforms in our
sample period are illustrated in the Appendix Figure 7. We can exploit these reforms as a source of
variation in the price of giving, since the tax rate essentially determines the size of the tax subsidy
to charitable donations.
The typical approach in the literature on the elasticity of the tax price of giving is to run log-
specifications of the form:
ln(dit) = β1ln(1− τit) + β2ln(yit) + β′3Xit + Γi + Γt + εit (3)
20In this case, we exclude the public sector.
21Besides these tests, we have also checked for heterogeneity across sex and age groups and did not find any substantial
differences.
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where dit is the donation amount and yit is disposable income before donations of individual i at
time t. τit is the marginal tax rate and hence 1 − τit is the price of giving. Xit is a vector of other
controls. Specifications estimated using panel data can also include individual and time fixed effects,
Γi and Γt. The price elasticity is then given by β1.
Estimating this equation using standard OLS leads to an endogeneity problem. Charitable donations
can affect the price of giving because these may shift taxpayers to lower tax brackets, thereby
reducing the tax price and causing an upward bias in the estimated elasticities. This is a well-known
endogeneity problem in the literature, and has been typically dealt with by instrumenting the last-
pound (observed) price of giving with the first-pound price of giving (1 − τit|dit=0 ≡ 1 − τ∗it). This
is the price a taxpayer faces for the first pound of charitable contribution. This removes any price
variation due to charitable giving, and results in a very strong first-stage because the first- and last-
pound prices are mechanically very highly correlated.
For the exclusion restriction to hold, the relationship between the first-pound price and the level
of donations must solely go through the last-pound-price of giving. As argued by Almunia et. al
(2017), this exclusion restriction is violated when using price variation from tax reforms because
such reforms create a second source of endogeneity. Specifically, changes in marginal tax rates can
also affect other choices such as individual labour supply and earnings more generally. Tax reforms
therefore affect choices which both enter the donation decision and directly affect the first-pound
price, because they determine which tax bracket a taxpayer is in, thereby violating the exclusion
restriction.
Almunia et al. (2017) propose a solution that leverages the availability of panel data, based on the
Gruber and Saez (2002) IV strategy that is widely used in the literature on the elasticity of taxable
income (for a review, see Saez et al. 2012). Their instrument uses lagged income values to predict
the reform-induced change in the price of giving. Specifically, they propose estimating the following
differenced equation:
∆ln(dit) = β1∆ln(1− τ∗it) + β2∆ln(yit) + β
′
3∆Xit + ∆εit (4)
where ∆ln(xit) = ln
(
xit
xi,t−k
)
for xit = dit, 1 − τ∗it, yit, and the log change in the first-pound price is
instrumented by:
ln
 1− τ∗i,t
(
y∗i,t−k
)
1− τ∗i,t−k
(
y∗i,t−k
)
 (5)
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The variable k determines the time horizon of the difference. In words, the instrument is the change
in the price of giving from time t − k to time t if taxable income at zero donations (y∗it) remained
unchanged. This instrument solves the endogeneity problem because it uses past (pre-tax) income
which should not be affected by future reform-related choices. In our empirical application, we
mainly follow Almunia et al. (2017) and implement the differenced-IV specification (4). To compare
our findings with existing practice, we also report results for the un-differenced IV estimates of
specification (3).
As already mentioned, our measure of donations also includes a union membership fee for some subset
of workers. We cannot directly observe the size of this fee or who is a member of a union. However,
using information on sector we can back it out with some noise. The banking sector in Cyprus is
large and (almost) fully unionised, meaning that all workers in this sector pay the same fraction
of salary in membership fees. Consequently, for the banking sector we can completely separate
donations from these fees. Apart from the banking sector a small number of other sectors, such as
the construction and hotel services, are highly but not fully unionised. We can therefore account for
fee payments for these sectors with some error coming from the small fraction of workers who are
not in a union.22 Lastly Cyprus has a number of sectors with very low unionisation. In these sectors
the donation measure will be somewhat noisy due to the small number of unionised workers. Given
these considerations, we use the sample of workers from the banking sector as our main sample in
the analysis, but show that all results are robust to using either the full sample or the sample of
highly unionised sectors instead.
5.1 Elasticity estimates
To get a picture of the sensitivity of elasticities to the existence of reporting thresholds, we split
our sample into two types of workers. The first group consists of workers who at some point bunch,
meaning that at some point in the sample period we observe them exactly at a threshold value. The
second group consists of those workers who never bunch meaning that we never observe them at a
threshold value. We then estimate elasticities separately for these two groups of workers using the
methods introduced above. As we are specifically interested in the stickiness of bunching behaviour
around our reporting thresholds, we need to clearly separate responses to tax prices from those
caused by changes in thresholds. We do so by focusing on the period 2003-2007, since this is the
22In this sample we do not include the public sector even though this sector is highly unionised. This is due to
the existence of two different rates for the union membership fee in the public sector. Since we cannot observe which
workers are subject to which rate we cannot correct the measure for membership fees in this sector.
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longest period in the data for which the reporting environment remains constant.23
Table 2 shows our results for these samples split across panels A to C. Columns (1)-(2) report
estimates using the first-pound price IV strategy, and columns (3)-(4) the results using the differenced
IV strategy with a time horizon of one year.24 Panel A shows elasticity estimates pooling across all
types of workers in the period in question (2003-2007), while panel B only considers those who never
bunch at a reporting threshold.25 Results from both the IV and differenced-IV estimation strategies
show that the never-buncher group displays much more sensitivity to price changes than the collective
group of workers, with estimated elasticities in panel B doubling in magnitude compared to those
in panel A. Results are also striking when we consider only workers who at some point bunch at a
threshold value. As panel C shows, this group is much less responsive to price changes. Estimated
elasticities are around half the size of the estimates for the entire group and about a quarter of the
size of the estimates for the non-bunchers. For robustness, we repeat the analysis using instead either
the sample of all highly unionised sectors, or our full sample. The results, shown in Appendix Tables
16 and 17, reveal the exact same patterns. In these samples the estimated differences are somewhat
smaller, consistent with the fact that we cannot precisely separate bunchers from non-bunchers given
the noise in the donation measure.
5.2 Assessing bunching stickiness
Our elasticity results are in line with a situation where bunching behaviour around reporting thresh-
olds is sticky and hence workers who bunch at the thresholds need strong incentives to change
behaviour. If these differences are driven by stickiness around reporting thresholds then the dif-
ferences above should be driven by bunchers being less likely to react to price changes, and not
from bunchers reacting less to a fixed price change compared to non-bunchers. To check this, we
non-parametrically calculate the proportion of workers changing their reported donations year-to-
year depending on whether they were bunching the previous year. If we look at what proportion of
workers change the amount they report in donations from one year to the next, we calculate this at
38% for those who bunched at a threshold the previous year, and at 79% for those who did not. If
23In both years 2003 and 2008 for instance, we observe changes in both marginal tax rates and hence prices. Note
that we cannot look exclusively at the last period 2008-2010, since we have no variation in tax rates in this period.
Including however the period before 2003 does not affect our findings.
24We use a time horizon of one year, since we are looking at a relatively short time period. However, if we use the
full sample period and estimate the elasticity using different time horizons, results are not sensitive to the choice of
horizon.
25Extending our analysis to the full sample period does not affect our results.
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Table 2:
Elasticity of donations with respect to price - bunchers vs.
non-bunchers (2003-2007)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price variable IV IV IV∆k=1 IV∆k=1
Panel A: All workers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.642
(0.169)
∗∗∗ −0.658
(0.180)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.419
(0.160)
∗∗∗ −0.375
(0.154)
∗∗∗
Observations 17 955 17 955 15 957 15 957
R2 0.62 0.62 0.20 0.21
Panel B: Excluding bunchers
ln(1− τ∗) −1.462
(0.335)
∗∗∗ −1.517
(0.372)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.818
(0.261)
∗∗∗ −0.786
(0.247)
∗∗∗
Observations 5 336 5 336 4 586 4 586
R2 0.72 0.72 0.27 0.28
Panel C: Only bunchers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.294
(0.188)
−0.306
(0.191)
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.253
(0.203)
−0.207
(0.198)
Observations 12 619 12 619 11 371 11 371
R2 0.52 0.52 0.17 0.18
Individual FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Controls - X - X
Notes: The sample includes all workers from the banking sectors in years 2003-2007. In all specifications we
control for income. Additional controls include age squared and a dummy for changing employer. We drop
people below the first tax bracket (i.e. people with no tax liability). We report robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
we only look at workers in years where they experience a change in the first-pound price then these
fractions increase to 44% and 91% respectively. These numbers support the idea of stickiness in
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behaviour around thresholds since both unconditional and conditional on a price change, bunchers
are much less likely to change behaviour from one year to the next.
We next check our non-parametric measures by repeating this analysis in a regression framework in
order to include controls. Table 3 reports results from a simple linear probability model where the
Table 3:
Buncher stickiness - Linear probability model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All ∆(1− τ∗) 6= 0 ∆(1− τ∗) 6= 0
1(buncher) −0.403
(0.007)
∗∗∗ −0.391
(0.007)
∗∗∗ −0.474
(0.013)
∗∗∗ −0.458
(0.013)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.785
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.813
(0.011)
∗∗∗ 0.913
(0.004)
∗∗∗ 0.895
(0.015)
∗∗∗
Observations 20 621 20 621 6 567 6 567
R2 0.16 0.20 0.27 0.28
Year FE - X - X
Controls - X - X
Notes: The sample includes workers from the banking sector in years 2003-2007. Controls include age squared, salary
and a dummy for changing employer. We drop people below the first tax bracket (i.e. people with no tax liability).
In columns (3) and (4) we restrict only to workers experiencing a change in the first-pound price. We report robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
outcome variable is an indicator for changing reporting from one year to the next. On the right hand
side we include an indicator for being located at a threshold value i.e. being a buncher, a constant and
potential controls. Column (1) simply shows the unconditional average fractions reported above. In
column (2) we control for year fixed effects, age squared, salary and a dummy for changing employer
and results remain unchanged. Column (3) reports the conditional average fractions discussed above,
where we only look at individuals experiencing a change in price. As before, adding controls makes
little difference to the results. Tables 18 and 19 in the Appendix report results using the alternative
samples of either all highly unionised sectors or all sectors. Both tables show results very much in
line with our main estimates, providing further evidence of a large and statistically significant dif-
ference between bunchers and non-bunchers in the probability of changing reporting behaviour and
reacting to price-changes. This supports the idea that the large effect of these reporting thresholds
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on elasticities comes from sticky bunching behaviour around the threshold values. Understanding
how reporting thresholds affect the way people respond to subsidies is essential when thinking about
designing a well-functioning enforcement system in combination with a subsidy level that promotes
the desired behaviour. It is also paramount for the external validity and interpretation of various
estimates of the elasticity of giving with respect to price as well as other similar elasticities.26
6 Conclusion
This paper studies behavioural responses to a widely-used tax enforcement policy that combines ele-
ments of self- and third-party reporting, using the context of charitable contributions in the Republic
of Cyprus. We exploit multiple sources of quasi-experimental variation in reporting requirements and
tax price subsidies to present several policy-relevant results.
First, we show evidence of substantial reactions to this hybrid reporting policy. Exploiting salary-
dependent cutoffs that govern documentation requirements and a regression discontinuity approach,
we estimate that reported donations increase by 0.7 pounds when taxpayers can report one pound
more without providing corroborating information from a third party. Second, by utilising a reform
that retroactively shifted the location of the threshold activating the need for documentation we
show that a very large part of this response is purely a reporting adjustment. Our bunching analysis
reveals that at least 64 percent of the response is purely due to changes in reporting and not to
changes in real giving. Finally, we show that the presence of such reporting thresholds has a strong
effect on taxpayers’ responses to other taxes and subsidies. We estimate the elasticity of charitable
contributions with respect to the tax price of giving, using quasi-experimental variation in tax prices
generated by income tax reforms. We find that this elasticity is significantly affected by sticky be-
haviour in contributions induced by the reporting thresholds.
Our findings have important implications, both for policy and tax theory. The very strong be-
havioural responses, observed around the reporting thresholds, imply that this hybrid policy strongly
influences misreporting of deductions and can consequently have a large effect on government rev-
enue. Further, our results imply that taxpayers’ responses to tax subsidies would be much stronger
in the absence of embedded thresholds determining the strictness of reporting requirements. To the
extent that the fiscal authority wants to incentivise certain forms of behaviours that generate positive
26In the results above we do not explicitly deal with censoring coming from people reporting zero donations. In
general, this can potentially create bias because such observations are excluded due to the logarithmic specification.
In our setting however this is not a concern since 87% of tax filers report positive donations.
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externalities, it is crucial to understand the conditions under which tax subsidies cannot achieve this
goal. Moreover, given that such thresholds are common in the tax systems of many countries, the
design of information reporting thresholds warrants a more direct incorporation in optimal tax theory.
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7 Appendix - Tables
Table 4:
Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev.
Salary Earnings Only 0.845 0.362
Ratio of Salary to Total Earnings 0.960 0.141
Taxable Income 12646.498 11139.126
Job Switches 0.028 0.164
Marginal Tax Rate 0.182 0.133
Positive Donations 0.873 0.333
Donations (cond. positive) 171.711 118.089
Positive Donations (Net of Union Fees) 129.87 103.436
Donations (Net of Union Fees, cond. positive) 0.788 0.409
Age 40.437 8.070
Female 0.385 0.487
Agriculture 0.005 0.069
Mining 0.003 0.051
Manufacturing 0.086 0.281
Construction 0.074 0.262
Utilities 0.021 0.142
Trade 0.120 0.325
Hotel Services 0.033 0.180
Other Services 0.186 0.389
Commercial Banking 0.066 0.248
Other Financial Services 0.033 0.179
Public Sector 0.360 0.480
Other 0.011 0.102
Observations 1,462,409
Notes: This table displays summary statistics for our sample. We distinguish between
positive donations, and positive donations net of union fees, where we residualise our
measure in the latter case from union fees. Both measures have professional taxes already
removed.
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Table 5:
RD estimates - including rounders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 38.43
(0.93)
∗∗∗ 36.35
(1.39)
∗∗∗ 35.81
(0.95)
∗∗∗ 34.10
(1.42)
∗∗∗ 37.06
(1.28)
∗∗∗ 37.40
(2.00)
∗∗∗ 34.85
(1.33)
∗∗∗ 35.29
(2.09)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.68 0.74 0.75 0.70 0.71
Observations 91 768 91 768 74 064 74 064 46 676 46 676 38 012 38 012
R2 0.26 0.26 0.32 0.32 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.26
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 29.50
(0.70)
∗∗∗ 31.79
(1.02)
∗∗∗ 30.10
(0.75)
∗∗∗ 30.82
(1.09)
∗∗∗ 31.72
(0.95)
∗∗∗ 27.66
(1.42)
∗∗∗ 30.98
(1.01)
∗∗∗ 26.56
(1.50)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.74 0.79 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.69 0.77 0.66
Observations 107 684 107 684 81 197 81 197 60 945 60 945 46 272 46 272
R2 0.33 0.33 0.39 0.39 0.22 0.22 0.30 0.30
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we include rounders to our main sample.
In this case, the specification also includes round number fixed effects. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter
estimate divided by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while
in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the
notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6:
RD estimates - years 1999-2002
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above10k 38.18
(0.83)
∗∗∗ 34.43
(1.25)
∗∗∗ 36.28
(0.84)
∗∗∗ 33.41
(1.27)
∗∗∗ 35.89
(1.17)
∗∗∗ 34.91
(1.80)
∗∗∗ 34.74
(1.19)
∗∗∗ 35.09
(1.84)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.76 0.69 0.73 0.69 0.72 0.70 0.69 0.70
Observations 114 588 114 588 93 830 93 830 59 023 59 023 48 459 48 459
R2 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.29 0.13 0.13 0.22 0.22
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 28.75
(0.69)
∗∗∗ 30.70
(1.00)
∗∗∗ 29.21
(0.71)
∗∗∗ 29.50
(1.04)
∗∗∗ 29.76
(0.94)
∗∗∗ 26.76
(1.41)
∗∗∗ 28.78
(0.96)
∗∗∗ 26.37
(1.44)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.72 0.77 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.72 0.66
Observations 116 837 116 837 90 641 90 641 64 941 64 941 50 592 50 592
R2 0.26 0.26 0.36 0.36 0.15 0.15 0.27 0.27
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we also include year 2002 to our main
sample. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e.
in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates
that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7:
RD estimates - including individuals with some non-salary income
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 35.07
(0.89)
∗∗∗ 31.84
(1.35)
∗∗∗ 33.11
(0.91)
∗∗∗ 31.07
(1.39)
∗∗∗ 33.17
(1.26)
∗∗∗ 32.36
(1.95)
∗∗∗ 32.34
(1.30)
∗∗∗ 31.78
(2.03)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.62 0.66 0.65 0.65 0.64
Observations 96 826 96 826 79 271 79 271 49 475 49 475 40 784 40 784
R2 0.20 0.20 0.27 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.20 0.20
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 27.63
(0.72)
∗∗∗ 29.46
(1.05)
∗∗∗ 28.66
(0.76)
∗∗∗ 28.80
(1.11)
∗∗∗ 28.65
(0.98)
∗∗∗ 24.49
(1.48)
∗∗∗ 28.30
(1.03)
∗∗∗ 24.79
(1.54)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.69 0.74 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.61 0.71 0.62
Observations 105 388 105 388 81 401 81 401 59 031 59 031 45 849 45 849
R2 0.27 0.27 0.35 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.25 0.25
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we include individuals with income from
both salary and non-salary earnings to our main sample. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided
by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the
parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls
include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8:
RD estimates - outcome variable corrected
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 36.58
(1.17)
∗∗∗ 35.19
(1.72)
∗∗∗ 35.64
(1.22)
∗∗∗ 33.45
(1.79)
∗∗∗ 35.06
(1.62)
∗∗∗ 35.51
(2.48)
∗∗∗ 33.55
(1.70)
∗∗∗ 32.96
(2.58)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.73 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.66
Observations 62 960 62 960 47 402 47 402 32 269 32 269 24 578 24 578
R2 0.11 0.11 0.24 0.24 0.08 0.08 0.22 0.22
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 28.28
(0.86)
∗∗∗ 27.25
(1.25)
∗∗∗ 27.98
(0.92)
∗∗∗ 25.68
(1.34)
∗∗∗ 26.25
(1.18)
∗∗∗ 23.67
(1.78)
∗∗∗ 25.11
(1.25)
∗∗∗ 22.60
(1.88)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.71 0.68 0.70 0.64 0.66 0.59 0.63 0.57
Observations 75 557 75 557 54 219 54 219 41 914 41 914 30 187 30 187
R2 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.10 0.23 0.23
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we net out professional taxes and union
payments from our outcome variable. In this case, we exclude individuals working in the public sector. The Implied takeup
is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter
estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of
order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 9:
RD estimates - only highly unionised sectors with corrected outcome
variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 38.77
(2.01)
∗∗∗ 33.67
(2.81)
∗∗∗ 38.74
(1.97)
∗∗∗ 33.88
(2.75)
∗∗∗ 35.09
(2.67)
∗∗∗ 34.97
(3.94)
∗∗∗ 34.75
(2.63)
∗∗∗ 34.43
(3.87)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.78 0.67 0.77 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69
Observations 13 805 13 805 13 805 13 805 7 496 7 496 7 496 7 496
R2 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.14
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 25.80
(1.76)
∗∗∗ 25.70
(2.67)
∗∗∗ 27.26
(1.67)
∗∗∗ 25.25
(2.54)
∗∗∗ 25.63
(2.45)
∗∗∗ 20.40
(3.88)
∗∗∗ 25.38
(2.34)
∗∗∗ 21.82
(3.70)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.65 0.64 0.68 0.63 0.64 0.51 0.63 0.55
Observations 13 531 13 531 13 531 13 531 7 638 7 638 7 638 7 638
R2 0.11 0.11 0.19 0.19 0.09 0.09 0.17 0.17
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we net out professional taxes and union
payments from our outcome variable, and restrict our sample to workers in highly unionised sectors (excluding the public
sector). The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e.
in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates
that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10:
RD estimates - only highly unionised sectors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 34.81
(1.29)
∗∗∗ 31.21
(1.92)
∗∗∗ 35.52
(1.27)
∗∗∗ 31.38
(1.89)
∗∗∗ 32.72
(1.82)
∗∗∗ 34.62
(2.81)
∗∗∗ 33.38
(1.80)
∗∗∗ 33.92
(2.75)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.70 0.62 0.71 0.63 0.65 0.69 0.67 0.68
Observations 35 100 35 100 35 100 35 100 18 322 18 322 18 322 18 322
R2 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 31.52
(1.17)
∗∗∗ 34.75
(1.70)
∗∗∗ 32.44
(1.15)
∗∗∗ 35.10
(1.67)
∗∗∗ 33.07
(1.57)
∗∗∗ 26.87
(2.36)
∗∗∗ 33.19
(1.53)
∗∗∗ 27.23
(2.31)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.79 0.87 0.81 0.88 0.83 0.67 0.83 0.68
Observations 30 407 30 407 30 407 30 407 17 574 17 574 17 574 17 574
R2 0.29 0.29 0.33 0.33 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.24
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we restrict our sample to those working
in highly unionised sectors (including the public sector). The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided
by the notch size in the donation schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the
parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls
include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 11:
RD estimates - only sectors with low unionisation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 33.08
(1.54)
∗∗∗ 33.04
(2.29)
∗∗∗ 33.55
(1.49)
∗∗∗ 33.60
(2.22)
∗∗∗ 33.88
(2.17)
∗∗∗ 32.84
(3.34)
∗∗∗ 34.57
(2.11)
∗∗∗ 33.81
(3.23)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.69 0.68
Observations 33 700 33 700 33 597 33 597 17 134 17 134 17 082 17 082
R2 0.19 0.19 0.25 0.25 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 28.99
(1.12)
∗∗∗ 27.89
(1.61)
∗∗∗ 28.76
(1.08)
∗∗∗ 27.60
(1.55)
∗∗∗ 27.79
(1.51)
∗∗∗ 24.08
(2.25)
∗∗∗ 27.51
(1.45)
∗∗∗ 25.19
(2.15)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.72 0.70 0.72 0.69 0.69 0.60 0.69 0.63
Observations 40 831 40 831 40 688 40 688 22 635 22 635 22 549 22 549
R2 0.29 0.29 0.35 0.35 0.18 0.18 0.24 0.24
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows robustness checks from estimating specification (1) when we restrict our sample to those not working
in highly unionised sectors. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the
donation schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided
by 40). ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 12:
RD estimates - Only males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 34.76
(1.23)
∗∗∗ 33.04
(1.80)
∗∗∗ 34.15
(1.17)
∗∗∗ 32.74
(1.71)
∗∗∗ 34.16
(1.71)
∗∗∗ 32.76
(2.56)
∗∗∗ 33.67
(1.63)
∗∗∗ 32.78
(2.44)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.70 0.66 0.68 0.65 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.66
Observations 47 705 47 705 47 632 47 632 25 220 25 220 25 184 25 184
R2 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.28 0.13 0.13 0.21 0.21
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 27.93
(1.13)
∗∗∗ 28.64
(1.64)
∗∗∗ 27.18
(1.07)
∗∗∗ 27.76
(1.54)
∗∗∗ 27.96
(1.53)
∗∗∗ 22.78
(2.29)
∗∗∗ 27.01
(1.44)
∗∗∗ 22.91
(2.13)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.70 0.72 0.68 0.69 0.70 0.57 0.68 0.57
Observations 43 398 43 398 43 316 43 316 24 150 24 150 24 097 24 097
R2 0.30 0.30 0.37 0.37 0.18 0.18 0.27 0.27
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating specification (1) on our main sample restricting only to males. We pool
years 1999-2001. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation schedule
(i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40). ps indicates
that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 13:
RD estimates - Only females
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 34.56
(1.78)
∗∗∗ 30.41
(2.81)
∗∗∗ 35.06
(1.72)
∗∗∗ 32.43
(2.69)
∗∗∗ 32.45
(2.63)
∗∗∗ 33.08
(4.39)
∗∗∗ 34.64
(2.53)
∗∗∗ 37.30
(4.21)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.69 0.61 0.70 0.65 0.65 0.66 0.69 0.75
Observations 21 095 21 095 21 065 21 065 10 236 10 236 10 220 10 220
R2 0.21 0.21 0.29 0.29 0.12 0.12 0.21 0.21
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 32.97
(1.21)
∗∗∗ 34.20
(1.73)
∗∗∗ 34.41
(1.15)
∗∗∗ 34.14
(1.66)
∗∗∗ 33.71
(1.59)
∗∗∗ 28.53
(2.39)
∗∗∗ 33.56
(1.52)
∗∗∗ 29.40
(2.30)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.84 0.71 0.84 0.74
Observations 27 840 27 840 27 779 27 779 16 059 16 059 16 026 16 026
R2 0.32 0.32 0.40 0.40 0.21 0.21 0.30 0.30
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating specification (1) on our main sample restricting only to females. We
pool years 1999-2001. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation
schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40).
ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 14:
RD estimates - ages 25-39
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 31.50
(1.29)
∗∗∗ 29.63
(1.97)
∗∗∗ 31.43
(1.24)
∗∗∗ 29.97
(1.90)
∗∗∗ 31.37
(1.88)
∗∗∗ 30.97
(2.90)
∗∗∗ 31.90
(1.82)
∗∗∗ 32.17
(2.77)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.63 0.59 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.64
Observations 42 068 42 068 42 014 42 014 21 096 21 096 21 069 21 069
R2 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.18
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 29.92
(0.99)
∗∗∗ 33.50
(1.43)
∗∗∗ 30.95
(0.94)
∗∗∗ 33.01
(1.37)
∗∗∗ 32.37
(1.33)
∗∗∗ 26.22
(1.99)
∗∗∗ 32.05
(1.26)
∗∗∗ 26.93
(1.90)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.75 0.84 0.77 0.83 0.81 0.66 0.86 0.67
Observations 45 534 45 534 45 446 45 446 26 164 26 164 26 106 26 106
R2 0.29 0.29 0.36 0.36 0.18 0.19 0.27 0.27
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating specification (1) on our main sample restricting only to ages 25 to 39. We
pool years 1999-2001. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation
schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40).
ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 15:
RD estimates - ages 40-54
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Panel A:
Above 10k 39.58
(1.63)
∗∗∗ 36.19
(2.36)
∗∗∗ 38.80
(1.52)
∗∗∗ 37.24
(2.23)
∗∗∗ 37.37
(2.20)
∗∗∗ 35.88
(3.40)
∗∗∗ 37.73
(2.08)
∗∗∗ 36.95
(3.25)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.79 0.72 0.78 0.74 0.74 0.72 0.75 0.74
Observations 26 732 26 732 26 683 26 683 14 360 14 360 14 335 14 335
R2 0.24 0.24 0.32 0.32 0.16 0.16 0.27 0.27
Panel B:
Above 7.5k 29.98
(1.52)
∗∗∗ 27.48
(2.16)
∗∗∗ 30.12
(1.41)
∗∗∗ 26.80
(2.01)
∗∗∗ 27.50
(2.02)
∗∗∗ 23.57
(3.01)
∗∗∗ 26.28
(1.88)
∗∗∗ 24.38
(2.77)
∗∗∗
Implied takeup 0.75 0.69 0.75 0.67 0.69 0.59 0.66 0.61
Observations 25 704 25 704 25 649 25 649 14 045 14 045 14 017 14 017
R2 0.31 0.31 0.42 0.42 0.18 0.18 0.30 0.30
Polynomial p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2 p1 p2
Controls - - X X - - X X
Bandwidth 2 000 2 000 2 000 2 000 1 000 1 000 1 000 1 000
Notes: This table shows the results from estimating specification (1) on our main sample restricting only to ages 40 to 54. We
pool years 1999-2001. The Implied takeup is calculated as the parameter estimate divided by the notch size in the donation
schedule (i.e. in panel A the parameter estimate is divided by 50 while in panel B the parameter estimate is divided by 40).
ps indicates that we fit a polynomial of order s on each side of the notch, while controls include sex, year and sector fixed
effects. Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 16:
Elasticity of donations with respect to price - bunchers vs.
non-bunchers (2003-2007)
(Sample: All highly unionised sectors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price variable IV IV IV∆k=1 IV∆k=1
Panel A: All workers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.428
(0.131)
∗∗∗ −0.426
(0.148)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.345
(0.126)
∗∗∗ −0.363
(0.126)
∗∗∗
Observations 25 822 25 822 22 644 22 644
R2 0.69 0.69 0.26 0.27
Panel B: Excluding bunchers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.725
(0.208)
∗∗∗ −0.774
(0.213)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.630
(0.199)
∗∗∗ −0.669
(0.194)
∗∗∗
Observations 9 110 9 110 7 708 7 708
R2 0.75 0.75 0.32 0.32
Panel C: Only bunchers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.361
(0.154)
∗∗ −0.342
(0.160)
∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.241
(0.162)
−0.232
(0.162)
Observations 16 712 16 712 14 936 14 936
R2 0.64 0.64 0.23 0.24
Individual FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Controls - X - X
Notes: The sample includes workers from all hihgly unionised sectors in years 2003-2007. In all specifications
we control for income. Additional controls include age squared and a dummy for changing employer. We drop
people below the first tax bracket (i.e. people with no tax liability). We report robust standard errors clustered
at the individual level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 17:
Elasticity of donations with respect to price - bunchers vs.
non-bunchers (2003-2007)
(Sample: All)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price variable IV IV IV∆k=1 IV∆k=1
Panel A: All workers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.432
(0.064)
∗∗∗ −0.409
(0.065)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.411
(0.068)
∗∗∗ −0.394
(0.068)
∗∗∗
Observations 55 416 55 416 47 574 47 574
R2 0.74 0.74 0.27 0.27
Panel B: Excluding bunchers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.555
(0.105)
∗∗∗ −0.523
(0.107)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.593
(0.101)
∗∗∗ −0.580
(0.099)
∗∗∗
Observations 23 604 23 604 20 729 20 729
R2 0.81 0.81 0.30 0.30
Panel C: Only bunchers
ln(1− τ∗) −0.360
(0.080)
∗∗∗ −0.344
(0.081)
∗∗∗
∆ln(1− τ∗) −0.306
(0.094)
∗∗∗ −0.282
(0.094)
∗∗∗
Observations 31 812 31 812 26 845 26 845
R2 0.64 0.64 0.25 0.25
Individual FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Controls - X - X
Notes: The sample includes workers from all sectors in years 2003-2007. In all specifications we control for
income. Additional controls include age squared and a dummy for changing employer. We drop people below
the first tax bracket (i.e. people with no tax liability). We report robust standard errors clustered at the
individual level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 18:
Buncher stickiness - Linear probability model
(Sample: All highly unionised sectors)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All ∆(1− τ∗) 6= 0 ∆(1− τ∗) 6= 0
1(buncher) −0.381
(0.006)
∗∗∗ −0.370
(0.006)
∗∗∗ −0.428
(0.011)
∗∗∗ −0.421
(0.011)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.791
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.816
(0.009)
∗∗∗ 0.930
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.885
(0.011)
∗∗∗
Observations 33 031 33 031 11 548 11 548
R2 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.24
Year FE - X - X
Controls - X - X
Notes: The sample includes workers from all highly unionised sectors in years 2003-2007. Controls include age squared,
salary and a dummy for changing employer. We drop people below the first tax bracket (i.e. people with no tax
liability). In columns (3) and (4) we restrict only to workers experiencing a change in the first-pound price. We report
robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 19:
Buncher stickiness - Linear probability model
(Sample: All)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All All ∆(1− τ∗) 6= 0 ∆(1− τ∗) 6= 0
1(buncher) −0.425
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.423
(0.004)
∗∗∗ −0.473
(0.007)
∗∗∗ −0.468
(0.007)
∗∗∗
Constant 0.746
(0.002)
∗∗∗ 0.777
(0.006)
∗∗∗ 0.850
(0.003)
∗∗∗ 0.863
(0.009)
∗∗∗
Observations 77 269 77 269 27 872 27 872
R2 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.20
Year FE - X - X
Controls - X - X
Notes: The sample includes workers from all sectors in years 2003-2007. Controls include age squared, salary and a
dummy for changing employer. We drop people below the first tax bracket (i.e. people with no tax liability). In
columns (3) and (4) we restrict only to workers experiencing a change in the first-pound price. We report robust
standard errors clustered at the individual level in parenthesis, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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8 Appendix - Figures
Figure 6:
Information on tax returns regarding thresholds
(a) 2002
(b) 2003
(Form I.R.1A employee) 2003                                                       
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Notes: This set of figures shows the information provided on the tax return regarding filing thresholds for different years.
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Figure 7:
Schedule of marginal tax rates (years 1999-2010)
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Notes: The figure shows the schedule of marginal tax rates in place in the Republic Of Cyprus in the years 1999-2010.
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Figure 8:
Schedule of professional taxes (before 2003)
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Notes: The figure shows the schedule of professional taxes in place in the years prior to 2003. The tax was dependent on salary
income, with incremental steps until CYP 30,001. Vertical lines indicate the notches in the schedule for deductible donations
without the provision of receipts.
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Figure 9:
Density of salary income between 1999-2001
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Notes: This figure shows the density of salaries pooled over the years 1999-2001, for two samples: (a) all salary earners
and (b) all salary earners excluding those earning at exact multiples of CYP500. In each case, the two earnings
thresholds that we focus on (7,500 and 10,000) are marked with vertical lines. Panel (b) also reports the results from a
McCrary test for discontinuities in the density of the assignment variable (the estimated log difference in height). The
null of no discontinuity cannot be rejected at any of the two earnings cutoffs, in support of the assumptions of our RD
design.
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Figure 10:
Robustness check: Smoothness of covariates
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Notes: This figure shows evidence in support of the RD identifying assumption. Each sub-figure shows the mean value
of the given covariate in bins of width 50 of the assignment variable around each salary threshold. The sample is the
same as in our main specification (pooled over 1999-2001).
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Figure 11:
Bunching at CYP 150 with estimated counterfactual, main sample
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010. It plots the
yearly empirical distribution in bins of width CYP 5, together with the estimated counterfactual. Each sub-figure reports the
normalised excess bunching mass b around the CYP 150 threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
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Figure 12:
Bunching at CYP 175 with estimated counterfactual, main sample
(a) 2003
 b = 0.025(0.033)
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010. It plots the
yearly empirical distribution in bins of width CYP 5, together with the estimated counterfactual. Each sub-figure reports the
normalised excess bunching mass b around the CYP 175 threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.
54
Figure 13:
Donations between 2003-2010 of those bunching at CYP 150 in 2007
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Notes: This figure shows the empirical distribution of donations before and after 2007, for the sample of salary earners who
bunched at CYP 150 in 2007. Vertical solid lines mark the relevant threshold that is in place in a given year (CYP 150 during
2003-2006 and CYP 175 during 2008-2010), while dashed lines mark the other threshold that has either been eliminated, or has
not been yet introduced. 55
Figure 14:
Donations between 2003-2010 of those bunching at CYP 175 in 2008
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Notes: This figure shows the empirical distribution of donations before and after 2008, for the sample of salary earners who
bunched at CYP 175 in 2008. Vertical solid lines mark the relevant threshold that is in place in a given year (CYP 150 during
2003-2007 and CYP 175 during 2009-2010), while dashed lines mark the other threshold that has either been eliminated, or has
not been yet introduced. 56
Figure 15:
When did people file their taxes for 2008?
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Notes: The figure shows, in weekly bins, the fraction of people filing their taxes for the fiscal year 2008. Vertical dashed and
solid lines mark the end of the the fiscal year (31 December 2008) and filing deadline (30 April 2009) respectively.
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Figure 16:
Fraction reporting specific amounts of donations over time
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Notes: This figure shows the fraction of individuals reporting each of the following amounts of donations over time: over 175,
over 150, 150 and 175 (all in CYP).
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Figure 17:
Salary growth rates of 2007 bunchers
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Notes: This figure shows the yearly salary growth rate between 2003-2010 of salary earners bunching at the CYP 150 threshold
in 2007.
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Figure 18:
Bunching around reporting thresholds, excluding highly unionised sectors
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010 by plotting the
yearly empirical distributions in bins of width CYP 5. The sample is restricted to those not in highly unionised sectors and drops
those whose sector is not observed. Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess bunching mass b around the CYP 150 and
CYP 175 thresholds, with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Vertical solid lines mark the threshold that is in place
in a given year, while dashed lines mark the other threshold that has either been eliminated, or has not been yet introduced.
60
Figure 19:
Bunching at CYP 150 with counterfactual, excl. highly unionised sectors
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010, restricting the
sample to those not in highly unionised sectors and dropping those whose sector is not observed. It plots the yearly empirical
distribution in bins of width CYP 5, together with the estimated counterfactual. Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess
bunching mass b around the CYP 150 threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.61
Figure 20:
Bunching at CYP 175 with counterfactual, excl. highly unionised sectors
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010, restricting the
sample to those not in highly unionised sectors and dropping those whose sector is not observed. It plots the yearly empirical
distribution in bins of width CYP 5, together with the estimated counterfactual. Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess
bunching mass b around the CYP 175 threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors are in parentheses.62
Figure 21:
Bunching estimates over time, excluding highly unionised sectors
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Notes: This figure shows the estimates of the excess mass around both the CYP 150 and 175 thresholds between 2003-2010,
restricting the sample to those not in highly unionised sectors. The shaded areas demarcate 95% confidence intervals.
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Figure 22:
Bunching of donations, removing union fees
(a) 2003
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010, by plotting the
yearly empirical distributions in bins of width CYP 5. The sample is restricted to only those whose sector can be observed. For
those in highly unionised sectors, the union fees have been removed. Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess bunching
mass b around the CYP 150 and CYP 175 thresholds, with bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Vertical solid lines
mark the threshold that is in place in a given year, while dashed lines mark the other threshold that has either been eliminated,
or has not been yet introduced.
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Figure 23:
Bunching at CYP 150 with counterfactual, removing union fees
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010, for the main
sample but restricted to only those whose sector can be observed. For those in highly unionised sectors, the union fees have
been removed. It plots the yearly empirical distribution in bins of width CYP 5, together with the estimated counterfactual.
Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess bunching mass b around the CYP 150 threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors
are in parentheses.
65
Figure 24:
Bunching at CYP 175 with counterfactual, removing union fees
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Notes: This figure shows the bunching dynamics of positive donations among salary earners between 2003-2010, for the main
sample but restricted to only those whose sector can be observed. For those in highly unionised sectors, the union fees have
been removed. It plots the yearly empirical distribution in bins of width CYP 5, together with the estimated counterfactual.
Each sub-figure reports the normalised excess bunching mass b around the CYP 175 threshold. Bootstrapped standard errors
are in parentheses.
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Figure 25:
Bunching estimates over time, removing union fees
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Notes: This figure shows the estimates of the excess mass around both the CYP 150 and 175 thresholds between 2003-2010.
The shaded areas demarcate 95% confidence intervals. The sample is restricted to salary earners whose sector is observed (but
excludes the public sector), and the outcome variable has been adjusted for union fees among those in highly unionised sectors.
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Figure 26:
Robustness of reporting response to polynomial order of counterfactual fit
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Notes: This figure plots estimates of (the lower bound of) the reporting response, LR, for different values of the order of
polynomial used to estimate the counterfactual density in our bunching analysis. The shaded areas demarcate 95% confidence
intervals.
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